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Abstract 
Violent encounters between groups of individuals often leave one or more of the 
participants dead, and it may be clear from the evidence that the physical cause of 
death was set by the single, deliberate act of one of the participants only. When 
this happens, the question arises whether, and how, responsibility for the fatal act 
and/or for its consequences can be attributed to other participants in the punch-up. 
Criminal law has long sought – and found – ways of holding others apart from the 
direct agent responsible for the harms caused in such encounters, although the 
legal constructions used differ between legal systems and often change significantly 
over time even within the same jurisdiction. This paper investigates the 
appropriateness of different criminal-law responses to these cases from two 
directions: first, by exploring the possible doctrinal grounds within the criminal law 
for attributing responsibility for the fatal act/outcome to all participants; and then 
by investigating the extent to which these responsibility-ascriptions are supported 
or challenged by insights from psychological studies of group action. 
Key words 
Group violence; crowd psychology; participation in crime; secondary liability; joint 
enterprise 
Resumen 
Los encuentros violentos entre grupos de individuos a menudo acaban con la 
muerte de uno o más de los participantes, y las pruebas pueden demostrar que la 
causa física de la muerte fue el acto único deliberado de uno solo de los 
participantes. Cuando esto ocurre, se plantea la pregunta de si se puede atribuir a 
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otros participantes en la pelea la responsabilidad por el acto fatal y/o sus 
consecuencias, y cómo hacerlo. Durante mucho tiempo, el derecho penal ha 
buscado, y encontrado, formas de retener a otros participantes, además del 
responsable directo de los daños causados, aunque las construcciones legales 
utilizadas difieren entre sistemas jurídicos y a menudo cambian significativamente a 
lo largo del tiempo, incluso dentro de la misma jurisdicción. Este artículo investiga 
la conveniencia de diferentes respuestas del derecho penal a estos casos, desde 
dos enfoques: primero, explorando los posibles fundamentos doctrinales dentro del 
derecho penal para atribuir la responsabilidad del acto / resultado fatal a todos los 
participantes; y a continuación, investigando hasta qué punto los estudios 
psicológicos sobre acciones grupales confirman o rechazan esta imputación de 
responsabilidad. 
Palabras clave 
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1. Introduction 
Some years ago, friends of my parents, ethnic Germans who had emigrated in the 
1990s from the former Soviet Union to reunified Germany, were telling tales about 
what life had been like in their small Siberian town to which, courtesy of Stalin, 
they had been forcibly resettled in the 1950s. The locals had not taken kindly to the 
new arrivals. Things were tense, even violent. Eventually a modus vivendi evolved. 
For most of the week the locals would leave the newcomers to get on with things, 
and vice versa, but on Saturday nights, everybody would drink. Then the young 
men would meet, size each other up, and violent fist-fights would follow. 
Sometimes someone would be injured quite badly and then there might be less 
fighting the following weekend but eventually things would go back to the previous 
level. Going out on Saturday night meant going out to drink, and going out to drink 
meant going out to fight. As a young man living in that place, this was how you 
spent your Saturday nights, until you grew older and had a family and were no 
longer one of the young men.  
If during such a fight anyone had been killed, who, apart from the one who struck 
the fatal blow, should have been held responsible for that outcome? Should that 
turn on the exact intentions of the one who struck the fatal blow – maybe he 
wanted to go after this victim especially, due to some particular personal enmity, 
and even intended to kill him? Or should it turn on whether the fatal act was 
outwardly within the unspoken conventions of these fights – fists, but no weapons, 
like glass shards or knives, and (though that is getting us in something of a grey 
area already) no kicks with boots against the head of someone already down? Or 
was it a simple matter of the foreseeability of such an outcome to everyone 
involved? There was probably no granny in that village who didn’t worry every 
Saturday night that something as bad as this might happen. And who, exactly, 
should count as “involved”? All the young men out and about that night on the 
slayer’s side? Would that include or exclude those who may still have been finishing 
their beers when the fatal act happened? Or should we only hold those responsible 
who were right there with the slayer, egging him on, when he struck? Or, to the 
contrary, should we perhaps assign responsibility for what happened to all the 
young men present, no matter what side of the fight they were on? After all, it 
could well be said that they all contributed to the escalation of the violence that 
night. And while we’re at it: what, exactly, should prevent us from extending 
liability to all young men usually participating in these fights, even if they had 
stayed home with a cold on that particular Saturday night? 
These questions matter not just to philosophers and to ordinary people in social 
discourse: they matter also to the criminal law. There probably isn’t a criminal court 
judge in history who has never tried a case of spontaneous group violence. One 
could therefore be forgiven for assuming that, by now, the criminal law anywhere 
has its answers to these questions ready; answers that moreover reflect the settled 
judgments of decades, if not centuries. Nothing, alas, could be further from the 
truth. Like ordinary moral judgment, criminal law has at different times been 
tempted into giving positive answers to all the questions posed above, which – 
given that some of these answers pull in different directions – has embroiled the 
law in contradiction and unresolved tension.  
This paper is an extended search for an analytical framework best able to guide us 
towards defensible responsibility-ascriptions for serious injuries or fatalities that 
happen through spontaneous group violence. The violent encounters in which this 
question arises are precisely not the work of (by comparison) orderly and 
structured groups of people forming a distinctive social entity, such as a 
government or a management committee or even a club or association. In 
institutional or quasi-institutional settings, attribution-relations may well be based 
on legal or social relations of representation/agency, or on other formal authority 
relations within the group. What I am interested in exploring here are 
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responsibility-attributions that may be possible between individuals acting together 
spontaneously in pursuit of a common objective that consists in the infliction of 
violence against another person or persons. My hypothesis is that the violent nature 
of the objective, and the spontaneous manner in which it is pursued, matter for an 
analysis of these scenarios from a psychological perspective. This then raises the 
question whether, and how, the psychological analysis may be made relevant to the 
responsibility-attributions supported by criminal law doctrine. 
Questions of joint enterprise liability have been much debated in English criminal 
law circles in recent years (see, eg. Simester 2006, Horder and Hughes 2009, Krebs 
2010, 2015, Crewe et al. 2015, Dyson 2015, Wilson and Ormerod 2015). That 
debate has shifted, but not died down, with the Supreme Court and Privy Council’s 
combined decisions of 18 February 2016 in R. v. Jogee and Ruddock v. The Queen. 
I should state at the outset that my concern in this paper is not with the doctrine 
(nor with the phenomenology) of joint enterprises as such. My topic is, specifically, 
the question when and on what basis a participant in spontaneous group violence 
shares responsibility for an act performed or an outcome caused by someone else 
in the group. I introduce this problem through the facts and the reasoning of a 
fairly typical case of this kind decided by the Court of Appeal for England and Wales 
in 2004, which highlights the concepts the courts rely on: causation, connection, 
and association. Next, I try to make sense of these notions from a psychological 
perspective on group action. By connecting the psychology of these interactions to 
legal doctrine I hope to demonstrate that association is a problematic basis for 
responsibility-ascriptions for outcomes in that it potentially holds supporters on the 
margins liable for what they attempt to do rather than for what they succeed in 
doing. I also argue that the question of how the law should respond to behaviour 
that sends supportive signals but may not otherwise be effectual is subsumed 
under the wider question regarding the responsibility-ascription paradigm 
appropriate to such cases. The two paradigms most often relied upon in law and 
philosophy – the “group-act” and the “secondary liability” paradigm – are both, I 
argue, a bad fit for most cases of spontaneous group violence. A preferable 
approach is found in the Swedish “independent evaluation” model concerning 
parties to a crime.  
2. Attribution of responsibility to other group members in criminal law 
doctrine 
2.1. A typical case 
Let us start with a fairly typical case of violent group action leading to a fatality; a 
case decided by the English Court of Appeal in 2004. 
2.1.1. The facts 
In R. v. O’Flaherty, Ryan and Touissant [2004], the appellants (and three others, 
who did not appeal their convictions) had been convicted of the murder of one 
Marcus Hall (“the victim”). On the evening in question, the victim and about 15 of 
his friends – a group known as the “Peckham boys” – had come to the appellants’ 
home town to attend a nightclub. They were refused entry, but hung out outside. 
The appellants and some of their friends, who were at the club, encountered the 
victim and his group in the street outside the club. The judgment notes that “some 
from [the victim’s] group became involved with two men from what might loosely 
be called the appellants’ group”. The latter included a certain James, a friend of 
O’Flaherty’s, who was chased down the street by “a number of men one of whom 
was wielding a big stick”. The victim together with others was chasing another man, 
Hendrickson, down the same street. The victim carried a baseball bat.  
O’Flaherty decided to come to the aid of James and equipped himself with a cricket 
bat to do so. He caught up with the victim and his group in a street called Flower 
Street, and they exchanged blows with their respective bats. Despite the fact that 
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Ryan and Touissant, armed with a claw hammer and a beer bottle respectively, had 
by this stage joined O’Flaherty and were also delivering blows, O’Flaherty, Ryan and 
Touissant were forced to back off. Ryan and Touissant then took no further part in 
the events.  
O’Flaherty, however, went on chasing after the victim’s group. By the time 
O’Flaherty caught up with the victim and his group in another street, Park Street 
West, the victim was surrounded by a number of people, friends as well as 
enemies, and had been stabbed multiple times by one of the non-appealing co-
accused. The stab wounds were the dominant and direct cause of the victim’s 
death. The victim had also received some other minor injuries, not as such fatal. 
There was in any event no evidence connecting any of these other injuries to the 
appellants’ earlier encounter with the victim in Flower Street.  
2.1.2. The ruling of the court 
The appeals of Ryan and Touissant were allowed on the basis that none of the fatal 
injuries were inflicted during the time that they had joined O’Flaherty’s attack 
against the victim. While this was equally true for O’Flaherty, O’Flaherty’s appeal 
against conviction was dismissed. Unlike his successful co-appellants Ryan and 
Touissant, who had limited the enterprise they were participating in to the incident 
that took place in Flower Street, O’Flaherty was said by the court to have joined a 
wider enterprise which involved pursuing the victim and his group a farther distance 
after that encounter. It did not matter, said the court, that he had lost the victim 
and his group temporarily and only found them again after the fatal wounds had 
already been inflicted by others. O’Flaherty had made himself part of a wider 
enterprise to win the fight against the victim and his group while being aware that 
some of the other pursuers had weapons such as knives on them.  
2.1.3. The court’s reasoning 
The court suggests that “withdrawal or disassociation” from a joint enterprise, and 
the determination of the scope of the enterprise, often raise the same issue. Simply 
“walking away” suffices for a participant who never joined any enterprise that was 
larger in scope or objective than what had occurred up to the point he walked 
away; “notification” of the other participants that the defendant withdraws from the 
enterprise is, in such circumstances, unnecessary. By contrast, someone who joined 
a “bigger joint enterprise” can only disassociate himself up to the point where the 
bigger joint enterprise has reached the stage of an attempt, and he will ordinarily 
need to notify the others of his withdrawal in order for the withdrawal to be 
effective.1 When the common purpose that spontaneously arises between a group 
of people is not obviously a murderous one, the “murderous attempt” does not yet 
begin with the initial attack on the victim. It only begins when that further purpose 
is formed by one of the participants (in this case, then, when the stabber drew out 
his knife and lunged at the victim).  
2.1.4. Analysing the court’s decision 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in O’Flaherty only makes sense on the 
assumption that one treats Ryan, Toussaint and O’Flaherty as spontaneously 
forming and then jointly engaging in a “mini joint enterprise” on occasion of 
O’Flaherty’s encounter with the victim in Flower Street. This “mini joint enterprise” 
                                                 
1 A later case, R. v. Stringer [2011], suggests that where a person initially joins others in chasing the 
victim with hostile intent but then thinks better of it and stops, “[s]uch limited action on their part would 
not have properly founded a case that they were guilty of murder” (R. v. Stringer 2011, para. 53). The 
court goes on to suggest that this is so because the act-to-be-attributed was then not performed with 
the drop-out’s assistance or encouragement – this is, however, doubtful since their initial participation in 
the chase may well have egged the central agent on. A better explanation is that in such a case, the 
court permits a withdrawal simply by giving up the chase, even if that withdrawal is not communicated 
to the central agent, when it isn’t realistically feasible to communicate the withdrawal to the agent. The 
Stringer case is discussed further, in a different context, below. 
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is analytically separate from, and additional to, a larger attack on the victim’s group 
that is already happening at this time and which O’Flaherty then joins by further 
pursuing the victim in the knowledge that other people he was in the nightclub with 
are also going after the victim’s group.  
The acquittal of Ryan and Touissant is then explained by the fact that these two 
merely formed a “mini-joint enterprise” with O’Flaherty that consisted in helping 
O’Flaherty when he attacked the victim in Flower Street. But their behaviour never 
betrayed an intention to join any wider attack on the victim and his group that 
continued beyond this point (what the court calls “the pursuit”). Since they weren’t 
part of this wider attack, they could simply walk away. Also, it doesn’t really matter 
whether Ryan and Touissant knew that other people who were still pursuing the 
victim’s group carried deadly weapons on them, since they never associated 
themselves with the larger enterprise of taking down the victim and his group. They 
merely helped O’Flaherty out during his encounter with the victim in Flower Street.  
But the court’s analysis still leaves questions to be answered regarding the basis of 
O’Flaherty’s liability. If O’Flaherty wasn’t part of a larger enterprise to take down 
the victim and his group from the start, but only joined that larger enterprise when 
he pursued the victim further after the encounter in Flower Street, how does that 
make him a participant in the victim’s killing? O’Flaherty has responsibility for the 
stabber’s actions attributed to him even though he has not yet arrived in the street 
where the victim is stabbed and the stabber may well be completely unaware of 
O’Flaherty’s contribution to the attack on the victim. On what basis, then, does the 
court connect O’Flaherty to what the stabber did?  
Since O’Flaherty did not communicate with the stabber, nor was the stabber likely 
to have been in any way advantaged by O’Flaherty’s having joined the pursuit, 
there is no encouragement or assistance by O’Flaherty of the stabber that could 
somehow form the connecting link between these two. The injuries O’Flaherty had 
caused the victim during their earlier encounter were also in themselves too minor 
to facilitate the victim’s getting stabbed by the stabber. Thus, a direct causal 
contribution is likewise not made out. Even if we were to assume (contrary to what 
the court assumed) that O’Flaherty had already upon leaving the club, and before 
his first encounter with the victim and his gang, made himself part of the larger 
enterprise to “take the Peckham boys on”, this does not solve the difficulty. How 
and why is O’Flaherty connected to the stabber’s actions, when the stabber may 
not be aware at all of O’Flaherty’s contribution to the overall endeavour? 
It appears that only responsibility-attribution based on something like O’Flaherty’s 
unilateral decision to join the “larger attack on the victim and his gang” will do the 
trick. And for such attribution to occur, it appears to be unnecessary that any of the 
other agents are aware of who is part of their group. An agent can join in without 
the others knowing of him and his joining-up at all; and once he has joined (on 
terms that the others already follow), his actions are attributed to the others, and 
their actions are attributed to him. What model of liability would support such an 
attribution? 
2.2. Grounds of attribution: the possibilities 
Courts and writers on English criminal law have identified three main possible 
grounds of attribution of the actions of one group member to other members of the 
group: causal contribution, connection, and association (see eg Virgo 2012, pp. 
857-862 with further references, and reply by Mirfield 2013 with response by Virgo 
2013). Each of these concepts are drawn upon and employed to denote the basis 
on which responsibility for the acts performed by the central agent, P (in our case, 
the stabber’s stabbing of V), is attributed to another group member who did not 
perform this act, A (in our case, the unsuccessful appellant, O’Flaherty).  
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Where responsibility is attributed on the basis of a causal contribution,2 the concept 
is used in a wide sense. Both factual and psychological causal contributions qualify, 
and the familiar limitation that the free and informed act of a subsequent agent 
breaks the causal chain set in motion by an earlier agent, does not apply (or applies 
only in the sense that the earlier agents do not count as principals) (for detailed 
analysis, see KJM Smith 1991, Ch.3).  
While the case law on participation in crime often speaks of a causal contribution 
also in cases where A’s conduct is not a “but-for” cause of P’s conduct in the sense 
that P would not have committed the act in question “but for” what A has done, 
some courts, and many writers, have come to prefer to describe the link that must 
exist between A’s and P’s conduct in terms of a “connection”.3 The relevant 
connection is constituted by some involvement that A has in P’s crime – made out 
by the kind of conduct that makes a “contribution” (by some form of assistance or 
encouragement) but that need not qualify as a but-for cause. Some want to 
differentiate here further between practical assistance and verbal encouragement – 
for the former, it is said that the assistance must make a real contribution whereas 
encouragement only needs to be perceived by P. But, in fact, the basis for that 
further line is spurious. The concept of a “connection” is wide enough to cover A1, 
who gives P a gun that P takes along to carry out an attack on V, even if P in the 
event does not use the gun on V because V already dies from a kick to the chin 
delivered by P to knock V out, and A2, who recommends that P take a gun along 
(even if P decides against doing that). In effect, the notion of a connection resides 
in some discernible influence that A has exercised in the situation. 
The real problem arises when courts have to face up to the question how 
thoroughly, and through what, A and P need to connect. In R. v. Stringer [2011], 
an altercation at the home of one of the appellants between the victim, who had a 
reputation for violence, and his main attacker, led to a sequel when the main 
attacker and some others went after the victim and discovered him again, now 
armed with a baseball bat, a few houses down the street. The main attacker then 
gave chase to the victim; the appellants and some others followed at some distance 
and eventually caught up with the main attacker, who had by then chased the 
victim down and begun stabbing him with a knife. Whether at this point the 
appellants did anything to help, or (as they claimed) to put a stop to further 
stabbing, could not be determined. The prosecution’s case rested on the claim that 
the appellants (with the requisite knowledge and intent) had done a number of acts 
in support of the main attacker, of which the only allegation that could be 
established beyond reasonable doubt on the facts was that they had joined him in 
chasing the victim. In rejecting the appeal, the court concludes that: 
“there was ample evidence on which it was open to the jury to conclude that the 
[main attacker] was encouraged and assisted in the attack which he carried out on 
[the victim] by the conduct of the appellants in joining the chase. [The main 
attacker] had the comfort and spur of knowing that he was not on his own, but had 
the support of the appellants and the reasonable expectation that they would come 
to his aid if he needed it. We reject the argument that the judge ought to have 
directed the jury that the appellants’ conduct in chasing [the victim] (with the 
requisite mental intent) could not be sufficient for them to be convicted of murder.” 
(R. v. Stringer 2011, para. 55) 
Just what connects the appellants in this case to the main attacker, sufficiently for 
criminal liability for the main attacker’s actions to attach to them, remains, 
however, ambiguous. The final sentence of the quotation could mean that all that 
needs to be shown is that the appellants chased after the victim with the same 
general objective as the main attacker. The preceding sentence, however, points to 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., R. v. Mendez and Thompson [2010] (paras 18-23). Lord Toulson (who delivered the main 
speeches in Mendez and in Stringer, discussed below), writing extrajudicially, refers to this basis of 
attribution as “a broad theory of causation” (Toulson 2013, p. 238).  
3 This is, again, made explicit by Toulson (2013, p. 239). See also Law Commission (2007, para. 2.33). 
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the main attacker having “the comfort and spur of knowing that he was not on his 
own” but that the appellants were ready to help him, and this suggests that it is 
some influence their conduct has on the main attacker that constitutes the 
necessary connection. It implies that it is only when, and because, the appellants in 
joining the chase encouraged and assisted the main attacker in this particular way 
– by rendering effective psychological support – that their joining of the chase 
amounts to encouragement and assistance sufficient to found attribution of 
responsibility to them for the main attacker’s actions.  
The case of Stringer differs in this respect from O’Flaherty’s case, described at the 
outset. In Stringer, there is no doubt that the main attacker knows that the 
appellants are chasing the victim with him (even though they run more slowly, and 
it takes them a while to catch up). In O’Flaherty, by contrast, it remains unclear 
throughout whether the stabber was at any stage aware that O’Flaherty (or: a 
person he didn’t recognise who later turns out to have been O’Flaherty) had joined 
the pursuit of the victim and his gang. Certainly, in O’Flaherty the prosecution case 
was not put on the basis that O’Flaherty’s joining the pursuit contributed to the 
stabber having “the comfort and spur of knowing that he was not on his own”. 
True, as a matter of fact the stabber had that “comfort and spur” because other 
attackers were with him on the scene of the stabbing. What isn’t clear is how 
O’Flaherty’s running around in a different street looking for the main action could 
have contributed to that sense of comfort and support. 
Difficulties of this sort have led writers to propose that (at least in cases of joint 
enterprise) the ground of attribution is even less factually influential than the notion 
of a connection suggests (see eg Virgo 2012). A link merely through “association” 
has been proposed. For the defendant to be associated with the central agent in the 
relevant way, it is taken to be sufficient that the defendant (with the relevant mens 
rea) performed an act that, to an all-knowing observer, would indicate that the 
defendant shares the central agent’s purpose and does what he can to support it.  
The association principle was also drawn on to explain responsibility-attribution in 
“further act” scenarios in joint enterprise cases, where it was invoked to explain 
why (provided they foresaw the possibility that the central agent would commit this 
further act) other parties to the enterprise need not have made any direct 
contribution to the commission of the “further act” by the central agent in order to 
be held liable for the further crime. Following a terminology first introduced by JC 
Smith (1997) this form of liability came to be referred to as “parasitic accessorial 
liability”. This doctrine, and the extension of liability that it represented for 
secondary parties who merely foresaw the possibility, but did not actively support 
and directly intend, that the principal offender would commit this further act, has 
been abolished in English law by the decision in R. v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen 
(2016). Even so, it is worth considering from a more theoretical basis the question 
whether, in logic, association could form the basis of the attribution of responsibility 
to the first (and only) crime the central agent commits (cf also Virgo 2013, p. 586) 
– and, indeed, this appears to be the only basis on which O’Flaherty could be linked 
to the stabber’s act. O’Flaherty’s case does not concern a “further act” scenario. 
There is simply a multiplicity of individual acts by individual actors, all performed 
concurrently as part and parcel of the endeavour to take down the victim and his 
group. There is a basic asymmetry at work, in that the “joiner-in” must realise what 
he joins and intends to join on these terms (and if he doesn’t, like O’Flaherty’s co-
appellants, Ryan and Toissant, he can slink away again). But the “joined-up” need 
not realise that the joiner has joined them at all. Even though they may be 
unaware of the new group member, the joiner is still considered a party to their 
crime.4 In what would (post Jogee and Ruddock) likely be considered a significant 
                                                 
4 Note that the judgment does not address whether the acts of the joiner within the scope of the 
endeavour are also attributed to the other group members. This point did not arise in O’Flaherty’s case, 
because the case was not about tying the stabber to O’Flaherty’s acts. But it follows from the mutuality 
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extension of liability beyond the “ordinary principles of secondary liability” which 
that court insists should be “of general application” in all cases (R. v. Jogee; 
Ruddock v. The Queen 2016, para. 76), the connection is then not between two 
minds, or two actions. Rather, the connection would appear to be brought about 
through “joining a group” rather than through influencing another’s actions. The 
link is created by the joiner’s unilateral decision, and efforts, to do something that 
is effective in furthering the realisation of the goal that he shares with those he has 
joined in the group.  
One way of making sense of this would be to think of every individual act 
performed within the scope of the enterprise as an act of “the group”, and (via their 
group membership) to attribute each individual act to each of the group’s 
members. Whose acts get attributed in this way would then depend simply on who 
made himself part of that group by joining it through his acts. Association thus 
appears to be quite different from causal contribution or connection. Could the 
psychology of group action support act-attribution based on association?  
3. The psychology of violent group action 
It is difficult to find psychological studies of the sort of violent group actions that 
form the subject matter of the cases presented above. I have not been able to 
discover any publication directly on point (and not concerned with, say, adolescent 
behaviour or “peer pressure”).5 Psychologists, especially social psychologists, have 
however long shown an interest in the behaviour of crowds (e.g. Le Bon 1968). In 
an early article, Helen Clark (1916, p. 29) points out that crowd behaviour may well 
be observable in small groups as well as in large ones:  
“Under certain conditions, three, or even two, individuals may – for psychological 
purposes – constitute a crowd. The difference between the conditions of no-one-
else-present and of some-other-person-present may be as significant as, if not 
more significant than, the difference between the presence of one other or of 
twenty or two-hundred.” 
Clark proposes a basic differentiation between three classes of congregrates of 
persons, or crowds: aggregates, “when there is no initial leader, when the members 
become congregated [by means of] a common social object or event”; mobs, “a 
crowd in which there is one initial leader and also a number of subsidiary leaders … 
[who also] exert a comparatively great influence upon the other individuals”, and 
audiences, where “the influence of the leader is by far the most important, and the 
effect of the other members of the crowd upon each other is relatively slight” (Clark 
1916, p. 30). Although the kind of social event Clark has in mind is something like 
a 4th of July celebration, in her classificatory scheme the groups that formed in the 
O’Flaherty and Stringer cases can probably best be classified as aggregates. There 
was no clear leadership of the group in either case, and yet the members of the 
group were connected by sharing a “social object” or purpose, namely to take down 
the victim’s group (in O’Flaherty), and to conclusively defeat the victim (in 
Stringer). One phenomenon Clark highlights in her discussion of an aggregate of 
                                                                                                                                               
of the act-attribution among group members. If, based on what the court found, O’Flaherty was in the 
group, then he was in the group both for the purpose of attributing the acts of other group members to 
him, and for the purpose of attributing his acts to other group members. Of course, the legal basis for 
O’Flaherty’s conviction is to some extent unsettled by the decision in Jogee and Ruddock since that 
decision explicitly rejects the notion of “guilt by association or guilt by simple presence without more” 
and explicitly requires “the giving of intentional support by words or deeds, including by supportive 
presence, .. on ordinary principles [of secondary liability]” (R. v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen 2016, 
paras. 77 and 78).    
5 This paper focuses on the psychological literature because it is (like the criminal law) primarily 
interested in what goes on – consciously or unconsciously – within individual human agents (the “unit” 
to which criminal responsibility is ascribed). In much of the sociological and anthropological literature on 
violence, by contrast, the group or collective tends to be the behavioural unit that is being studied. One 
sociologist whose work has also focused on what enables individuals to act violently is Randall Collins. 
Connecting the insights of his work to criminal law conceptions of responsibility is, however, a larger and 
more complex task than can be attempted in this paper.   
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persons is that: “When others act as we act, and toward the same objects, we 
usually feel that they sympathize with us and approve of our conduct” (Clark 1916, 
p. 31). Clark then turns her attention to the consciousness and performance of 
members of a crowd, pointing out that “consciousness may be predominantly 
emotional, cognitive, or volitional” (Clark 1916, p. 32) and people in crowds 
automatically influence each other’s emotions, beliefs and actions. As Clark (1916, 
p. 32) observes, 
“Some emotions, especially fear and sorrow, are produced or intensified by 
witnessing in others the expression of like emotions, [and] it is evident that we 
tend to interpret objects as our fellows interpret them, to consider as real what 
others, by their behaviour, seem to recognize as real, and to accept as true the 
ideas which our companions appear to accept”.  
We also tend to copy each other’s behaviour, especially where that behaviour 
indicates a course of action taken to satisfy a perceived general need (Clark 1916, 
p. 32). Clark points out that these behavioural tendencies reflect evolutionary 
successful behaviours. While we may often engage in them without much thought, 
they do not, however, make us incapable of rational reflection.  
Later studies of mob violence suggested that participants in these groups do more 
than just influence each others’ behaviour in the ways described in the previous 
paragraph. As participants in a mob, they would experience a psychological state 
psychologists label “deindividuation” – a “loss of one’s sense of individuality and 
personal accountability that can sometimes occur in large, noisy, emotional crowds” 
(Colman 1991, p. 1072 citing studies by Festinger et al. 1952 and Zimbardo 1969, 
Dipboye 1977) and, suppressing self-monitoring, which makes people especially 
vulnerable to external, situational pressures (Colman 1991, p. 1073). Whereas the 
earlier studies of crowd psychology suggested how the actions of one may have 
inspired and influenced the actions of another (offering a possible basis for 
attributing responsibility for these actions to others in the group), the research on 
deindividuation convinced courts to consider the direct agents less responsible than 
they would have considered them, had they acted outside a mob context (Colman 
1991, p. 1075). (As would, presumably, be those who, by forming the mob, 
contributed to the phenomenon of deindividuation experienced by the direct 
agents.)  
This research is taken one step further in studies suggesting that, not only does the 
direct agent in some crowd situations not relate to his actions as actions for which 
he is responsible – he has no sense of ownership of them –, but that the very 
actions themselves are more extreme than the group members would be minded to 
perform outside the group context. This has been explored in research on group 
polarisation. Group polarisation refers to the phenomenon that “group decisions are 
riskier than the previous private decisions of the group’s members” (Stoner 1961 
cited in Isenberg 1986, p. 1141. Stoner’s experiment is described in Myers and 
Lamm 1976). The psychological mechanism that plays itself out (inter alia) in such 
“risky shifts”, is, however, a more general one of “group polarisation” that can 
affect all sorts of decisions. The “group polarisation hypothesis” is thus stated as 
the hypothesis that “the average postgroup response will tend to be more extreme 
in the same direction as the average of the pregroup responses” (Myers and Lamm 
1976, p. 603). The various explanatory models developed for observed polarisation 
effects include interpersonal comparisons and awareness of other group members’ 
views, whereas group decision rules seem to play no particular role (Myers and 
Lamm 1976, p. 610 ff.). More recently, the behavioural tendencies that underlie the 
effect achieved through “interpersonal comparisons” engaged in (consciously or 
not) by group members have been further explored in research on attitudes. The 
findings suggest that people in groups interact on a permanent “feedback loop” 
where their own attitudes not only influence their perception of others’ attitudes, 
but are also adjusted and influenced by reference to the presumed attitudes of 
others (Ledgerwood and Chaiken 2007). 
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The latter research suggests that the influence one group member has on another 
may operate entirely inside the second group member’s head. It is not something 
that the first group member says or does, but an assumption the second group 
member makes about what the first group member would say or think or do, that 
leads the second group member to revise his attitudes and, presumably, actions. 
Psychology, then, leaves us with a better understanding of how humans acting in 
proximity to each other – and, in some sense, in concert – influence each other’s 
decisions and conduct in ways that will often be untraceable and remain below the 
radar of their conscious reflection and thought. Psychology also suggests that when 
extremely violent actions emerge from a mob of people, the direct agents probably 
go further than they would have done if left to their single agency. The very 
objective that persons in a group may set themselves tends to be more extreme 
than the objective they would have set themselves individually. This can ground 
arguments that the direct agents should be viewed as acting under conditions 
where their responsibility for their actions is to some extent diminished – but it 
does not, as such, establish that responsibility can accrue to others in the group. 
These others are presumably subject to the same de-individuation and polarising 
effects of “group action” as the direct agents. Hence everyone’s responsibility 
appears to be diminished (if we think that full responsibility requires that an act is a 
true expression of our individual character or selves). But we do not, on the basis 
of psychology, have a plausible case for “offloading” the responsibility for the 
extreme act onto other group members.  
What the psychology of group action also does is to provide us with an 
understanding of what kind of “de facto” influence and support is occurring in 
certain contexts. From a psychological perspective, the argument that “I didn’t say 
anything to him or help him do it, therefore I didn’t influence him”, may well be 
hollow. In certain situations, “being there” or even just “being around” may well be 
all that is necessary to have a direct and perceptible effect on the actions of 
another.  
4. Connecting law with psychology? 
The criminal law, however, is set up to care about who does what. It starts with the 
direct agent, connected in a unique and crucially important way to his act, and its 
outcome. All other people’s possible connection to that very same outcome must 
contend with this – the doer’s act – as the object to which their responsibility must 
attach. The criminal law thus resists the idea of a “group’s act” in the true sense of 
the word. Whether or not the direct agent would have done what he did without the 
role played by others, such that a social psychologist might begin to think of the 
direct agent as a “vessel” or “conduit” for the emotions and objectives generated 
within and by the group, the criminal law’s regime of responsibility-judgments 
centres on the individual or individuals (e.g., when A and B together push C off the 
cliff) carrying out the fatal act. 
4.1. Connection between A and P as a basis for responsibility-attribution 
Let us come back, then, to the idea that responsibility-attribution for the central 
agent’s actions to others is based on a connection, which – as explained in section 
II – resides in some discernible influence that A has exercised in the situation. The 
psychological literature supports the conclusion that the court drew in Stringer, that 
merely by following the direct agent in his search for the victim – given that the 
direct agent was aware that the appellants had followed him when he went to look 
for the victim –, the appellants would have motivated the direct agent to stick to 
his plan to sort the victim out for good, and to act decisively once he found the 
victim. For these psychological effects to occur, the appellants did not have to be in 
the immediate vicinity when the stabbing occurred. It was sufficient for P to have a 
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reasonable expectation that they were close enough for him to call on their help if 
need be. 
Historically, the salient connection appears to have been perceived in slightly 
different ways, depending on the degree of interdependence between A’s and P’s 
actions. Where A is not present at the scene of the crime but made his contribution 
before the fact of the crime’s commission, Foster’s annotated Crown Cases of 1762 
suggests that what matters for A’s liability is whether what P did can “with any 
propriety be said to have been committed under the influence of [the] temptation” 
created by A (Foster 1762, p. 369). The formulation chosen by the same writer to 
capture the necessary connection between “[s]everal persons [who] set out 
together, or in small parties, upon one common design … and each takes the part 
assigned to him”, is, however, subtly different: what matters here is that “the part 
each man took tended to give countenance, encouragement and protection to the 
whole gang, and to insure the success of their common enterprise” (Foster 1762, p. 
350). The difference lies in the following: an act that “tend[s] to give … protection” 
is not necessarily an act that, in the circumstances, delivers that protection. It may 
even be an act that, as matters turn out, gives the enterprise away (say, a lookout 
who is so incompetent that he draws attention to the whole enterprise, and then 
fails to notice an observer who succeeds in calling the police). Likewise, an act that 
“tend[s] to give … encouragement” will not necessarily do so. What suffices for an 
act to have the relevant tendency is that it is the sort of act that can typically be 
expected to further the execution of the joint enterprise. What need not be shown 
is that, on the facts of the case, it had any contributory effect. By contrast, the 
question whether the direct agent’s actions were “committed under the influence of 
[A’s] temptation” implies that this temptation must indeed have played itself out in 
what P did. At least to my mind, then, the historical sources appear to have a wider 
principle of attribution in mind for what a continental lawyer would think of as cases 
of “co-perpetration”, as compared to the grounds of attribution in standard 
secondary liability scenarios.6  
Even if the case of joint activity “on the scene of the crime” does, in this sense, 
appear to allow for a slightly wider principle of attribution, the basis for this 
attribution still remains some perceptible difference that A made to P. At least, this 
is what another example given by Foster, of a case where A withdrew in time, 
suggests: Where A, B and C set out together to commit a crime, but C then openly 
walks away, thereby signalling to the others that he will not participate in 
implementing their earlier plan, C is not liable7 when A and B later carry out the 
plan together, because at the time that the crime was committed, there was no 
“engagement or reasonable expectation of mutual defence and support, so as to 
affect him” (Foster 1762, p. 354), meaning that C’s conduct could not have given A 
and B, at the time they committed the offence, any reasonable expectation that he 
would support them. 
In all these cases, then, the other participants’ connection to the outcome runs 
through the direct agent. This is undoubtedly so whenever the direct agent is an 
innocent or semi-innocent instrument of someone who stands behind him and who, 
as it were, acts through him. But it is also the case when the direct agent is a fully 
responsible agent to whom others have connected themselves in ways that 
constitute exerting an influence on the agent, albeit that the influence falls well 
short of controlling, governing, or determining the acts of the agent. Yet, one may 
                                                 
6 To this extent, I doubt the conclusion drawn by Toulson (2013, p. 235) from these quotations, that 
“joint criminal enterprise is an example of mutual assistance or encouragement” and “not a doctrinally 
separate basis of secondary liability”. The “mutual assistance or encouragement” that connects the 
parties of a joint criminal enterprise is such that it suffices that their acts tend to assist or encourage the 
success of the enterprise; and to this extent, they need to be less effective than the acts of a simple 
secondary party.  
7 Under today’s legal doctrine, effective withdrawal may require more of C than merely to walk away. 
This is not an issue addressed in this paper.  
Antje du Bois-Pedain Violent Dynamics 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 6, n. 4 (2016), 1053-1078 
ISSN: 2079-5971 1066 
question whether this factual connection is what matters for the attribution of 
responsibility. 
4.2. Conduct that signals a contribution to the flouting of a criminal-law norm 
Günther Jakobs, a German criminal law theorist, suggests that for responsibility-
attribution to be appropriate, the salient connection between the central agent’s 
criminal act and further parties is not constituted by any “communicative 
relationship between the further party and the direct agent”, but obtains “between 
the norm, the conduct [of the direct agent], and the punishment [of the further 
party]” (Jakobs 2014, p. 22). For Jakobs, the essence of criminal conduct is 
conduct that contradicts, or one might say flouts, a criminal-law norm. The further 
party’s conduct does not, as such, flout the substantive criminal-law prohibition: 
when it takes place before the commission of the offence by the direct agent, its 
objective communicative significance – its social meaning – is that of enabling or 
furthering a flouting of the norm in the future by the direct agent. From this 
vantage point, what matters for Jakobs is when the central agent’s flouting of the 
norm can be attributed to the further party. Jakobs’ answer is that it can be so 
attributed when the further party’s conduct can fairly be said to have “advanced” 
(vorangebracht) the norm-violation by the central agent, that is, when the further 
party moved ahead the sequence of conduct that culminated in the norm-violation 
(Jakobs 2014, p. 22).  
This relationship of “advancing” the norm-violation by the central agent does, for 
Jakobs, not just obtain between the central agent and any accessories before the 
fact. It also constitutes the link between the central agent and further parties active 
during the commission of the offence. Jakobs stresses that it is perfectly plausible 
that a party can advance the direct agent’s criminal norm-violation even though her 
contribution is (in the end) unnecessary for the offence’s success. Someone who 
explains to the direct agent how to disable an alarm system advances the 
commission of a burglary by the direct agent even if the direct agent finds the 
alarm system already disabled due to a technical malfunction (Jakobs 2014, p. 23; 
example adapted). Nor is it necessary for the central agent to be aware that 
another party takes steps to advance his project. Someone who places a weapon 
conveniently in the vicinity of the direct agent, hoping that the direct agent will 
discover it and use it to commit the offence in question, advances the direct agent’s 
movement towards the breach of the criminal law in a way that makes him liable 
for this breach (provided the direct agent does indeed find the weapon, and uses it) 
(Jakobs 2014, p. 22).  
Jakobs’ theory remains a conservative one, in that he requires some effect of A’s 
contribution on P. But his approach is of interest in the present context because he 
stresses that a theory of participation in crime must engage with the social reality 
of participatory conduct, in that it must capture the social significance and reflect 
the social meaning of various contributory acts (Jakobs 2014, p. 21). He later 
expresses this idea in the formulation that “the conduct of the further party signals 
that the central agent carry out the offence” (Jakobs 2014, p. 26). This signalling 
is, evidently, a wider concept than the still essentially fact-based notion of 
“advancing” the central party’s offending behaviour. The further party, as it were, 
hoists a flag: a flag that flies to tell other social agents, including the central agent, 
that the further party supports the commission of the offence. It is with the social 
significance of signalling behaviour in mind that we can take another look at the 
remaining ground of responsibility-attribution discussed in section 2.2: association.  
4.3. Association as a basis for responsibility-attribution 
The question posed by cases like O’Flaherty’s is whether it is possible to be 
connected to an outcome in the absence of any “broadly causal” connection to the 
actions of the central agent. Recall that O’Flaherty joined the “wider enterprise” 
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only when he continued to pursue the victim after their first, spontaneous, 
encounter during which O’Flaherty had merely come to the aid of one of his mates, 
and that O’Flaherty only came upon the victim again after the victim had already 
been stabbed, apparently before the stabber had become aware of O’Flaherty’s 
support for the attack. Whatever O’Flaherty’s connection to that outcome, it cannot 
possibly be causal – even in the broadest possible sense. 
What we can say, however, is that O’Flaherty, by continuing the pursuit, sent a 
signal to his social surroundings that he was part of the chase of “the Peckham 
boys” (the victim and his group). That signal was there to be received by others 
who were equally part of the chase. Whether any particular one of the other group 
members received that signal, may be irrelevant (so long as it is clear that some 
did). This is because the socially significant act is that of joining the group – an act 
that tends to reinforce the commitment of all group members to their common 
objective –, and (in the circumstances) all that O’Flaherty needed to do to join was 
to enter the pursuit. (It cannot be in doubt that the others would perceive him as a 
member of their group the moment he arrives on the scene of the stabbing, rather 
than as someone who is a mere observer. That he would be perceived in this way 
because they assume that he had supported the fight against the victim’s group as 
well as he could, is likewise beyond doubt.) 
While this explains why the court may have plumped for a wider principle of 
association in the absence of evidence that O’Flaherty’s actions had reached the 
horizon of situational perception of the stabber, it is still a problematic solution.8 
This is so because, at the end of the day, association then rests on the social 
significance not of an interaction but of a unilateral act performed with an intention 
to make oneself part of a group endeavour, and it is unclear how such unilateral 
activity can tie a person to another person’s acts and their results.  
On the association view, the essence of “joining a group effort” consists in 
committing oneself to the “common purpose” shared between the members of the 
group. And one comes to share in the group’s “common purpose” by adopting the 
group’s goal as one’s own, and by signalling one’s commitment to further the 
achievement of this goal through one’s own efforts. The actions taken by a joiner-
up matter only to the extent that they manifest a sharing of the common purpose 
of the members of the group. When the actus reus of participation need not be any 
more than this, particularly when the actions need not be at all effective in 
furthering the achievement of the group’s aims, then the acts of a participant 
matter only as tokens of his sharing in the common purpose. If that suffices, his 
liability is not for any influence he exercises over the actions of another, but is (as 
Baker 2015, p. 43, observes) structurally the equivalent of liability for an inchoate 
crime: D does something that expresses and implements his commitment to a 
criminal norm-violation, but he does not effectuate that norm-violation through his 
acts.  
Such a wide basis for contributory criminal responsibility would have serious 
consequences for individuals only vaguely associated with joint endeavours. Think 
of the young men in the Siberian village I alluded to in the introduction. A boy 
growing up in this village will at some point want to show that he has grown to be a 
teenager, old enough to drink. He will join the others who are drinking on Saturday 
nights (just as, on the other hand, young adults who have settled down with a 
family will begin to drop out of the group, or at least out of the fights that ensue 
later on the street, it being understood that their new responsibilities mean that 
they have outgrown participation in these fights). A particular young man can, 
perhaps, choose not to join in at all. But not to join in the fighting means not to join 
in the drinking, and this (if nothing else) means not to participate in the only social 
                                                 
8 Note that, after the decision in Jogee and Ruddock, that solution in any event appears no longer to be 
open to English courts (see R. v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen (2016), para 77). 
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activity on a Saturday night of the young men in his village. If he doesn’t mind a 
reputation for being weird, that would perhaps not affect too much how his life 
fares in the village. But he will be a loner, someone on the margins. Of course any 
of the young men who have joined the drinking and the fighting, perhaps not very 
zealously but enough to be a part, can sometimes stay home on a Saturday night 
or occasionally slink away before the fighting stage is reached. But a young man 
cannot do that every Saturday night without being challenged about it. Should we 
then say that anyone who does enough to signal to the others through his conduct 
across various Saturdays that he is “one of the group”, should be responsible for 
any after-drinking violence that happens on any particular Saturday? Assuming that 
P is spurred on by a sense that there are others around who are ready to help him 
if things go badly for him in the fight, and that all of the young Saturday-night-
“regulars” contribute to this sense with which P acts, should this really suffice to 
make them responsible for what P does on a particular Saturday night, even if they 
are still finishing their beers in the pub? If that kind of support sufficed, whole 
populations of youngsters in certain localities would have to be held responsible for 
any Saturday night fighting that occurred. Precisely this is the odiousness of 
collective criminal responsibility. It is not that the psychological analysis is a bad 
one. It is perhaps a perceptive one. But this sort of “support” just isn’t enough to 
justify treating the psychological reassurance-providers as involved in the direct 
perpetrator’s act for the purposes of the criminal law. 
This result is both philosophically and doctrinally significant. It establishes that 
mere association does not furnish us with a basis on which responsibility for a result 
brought about by another participant’s acts can be attributed to A. A’s association, 
which consists in his joining a common enterprise by an act that manifests his 
sharing of the group’s common purpose, is “full support of the purpose”, but 
nevertheless only an attempt to contribute to the achievement of the goal. If the 
goal is achieved by another group member who acts quite independently from A, 
then responsibility for the outcome of that act cannot be attributed to A. In line 
with what the UK Supreme Court has held in R. v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen 
(2016), responsibility for the direct agent’s actions may only run through a 
connection establishing that A made a contribution in the broad causal sense 
explained above. 
This, it should be stressed, does not leave criminal law incapable of response. But 
we need to think carefully about what kind of offence adequately captures the kind 
of responsibility that flows from this sort of “signalling behaviour”. What should be 
out of the question is to bring liability for a homicide offence to bear on the joiner-
in who merely signalled his supportive attitude but remained at the incident’s 
margins. It is far more appropriate to hold him liable for public order offences such 
as affray (Public Order Act 1986, s. 3) or public violence (Public Order Act 1986, s. 
2), which criminalise aggressive conduct that would cause a person of reasonable 
firmness to fear for her personal safety. That death or serious injury is caused 
during an incident of public violence may appropriately be treated as an 
aggravating factor in passing sentence but it should no longer (as in the older 
jurisprudence, for which see KJM Smith 1991, p. 211 note 5) lead to an ascription 
of responsibility for the death. 
The most appropriate legal response to participatory conduct whose impact was 
limited to the signalling effect described above might well be to hold such a 
participant responsible for an aggravated offence of “taking part in a fight during 
which serious injury or death is caused to any person” (German Criminal Code, 
section 231). Note that this provision requires no mens rea beyond the (blameable) 
intention to join the fight, that is, no intention to cause (or support others in 
causing) serious injury or death. It makes liability to punishment depend on a 
purely external fact – that death or serious injury is brought about somehow, 
whether through a deliberate, conscious, murderous act, or through an unhappy, 
unexpected fall, or anything else in between.  
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While the German “participation in a fight”-prohibition does include serious injury or 
death of any person caused by the fight among the criteria for liability, it is 
interesting to note that, this requirement notwithstanding, the provision is not 
strictly speaking one that holds every participant criminally liable for the injury or 
death of the victim. Liability attaches to the culpable participation in the fight, when 
the fight (objectively) turns out to have been a particularly bad one: bad because 
someone got seriously injured or died. The sentencing range (punishment by fine or 
imprisonment up to three years) is moderate compared to homicide offences – 
even negligent manslaughter (German Criminal Code, section 222), the least 
serious homicide offence, can be punished more harshly (by a fine or imprisonment 
up to five years). These punishments are quite comparable to those imposed under 
English law’s public order offences: Under the Public Order Act 1986, imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding three years, or a fine, or both, is the sentencing range 
opened up when a charge of affray is brought on indictment, and the more serious 
offence of violent disorder allows the court (on indictment) to impose a term of 
imprisonment of up to five years. The advantage of a special provision would simply 
be to capture through the offence label the indirect yet morally traceable 
connection in which A’s signalling behaviour stands to the serious outcome.  
But liability for manslaughter or murder, which both (in different ways) rest on an 
attribution of responsibility for the death of the victim to the defendant, requires 
more, and in the next section of the paper I want to address specifically when and 
on what basis ascription of responsibility for the death caused is in order. 
4.4. The true significance of (dis-)association 
Before I leave the topic of association, I however want to draw attention to the 
important way in which association does matter for responsibility-ascription under 
the secondary-liability paradigm. Its true significance lies in the severing of a 
causally-based connective link through disassociation. To see this, let us briefly turn 
our attention to Bernard Williams’ (1973, pp. 98-99) tale of Jim and the Indians, 
which Gardner (2007) has employed as a platform for his own contention that in 
some situations it does not matter who is doing the evil deed. Jim, a tourist 
travelling in some South American country, stumbles upon a clearing where a local 
paramilitary is about to shoot and kill all the inhabitants of a small village, but 
offers to let the other villagers go if Jim himself takes the gun and shoots one of the 
villagers. Why should Jim care that if he takes the paramilitary up on the offer, it 
will be him, Jim, who shoots the villager and not the paramilitary? After all, the one 
villager who is shot will be shot in any event, but by shooting the one villager he 
chooses to shoot, Jim will save all the others.9 Shouldn’t we say that it really 
doesn’t matter, morally speaking, that Jim would fire the fatal shot? Whatever the 
allure of this line of thought, it is deeply unattractive from Jim’s perspective, and 
also – more pertinently in the present context – from the perspective of the 
criminal law. If we ask what, if anything, connects Jim to the dead villager(s), it 
matters enormously who was “doing the doing”. If Jim shoots the Indian, with the 
mens rea required for murder, it is he who murders him. If the paramilitary shoots 
the villagers, it is the paramilitary who murders them.  
Under modern English secondary liability doctrine, this is however not the end of 
the story for Jim, but rather the beginning. Can we not say that Jim “encourages”, 
possibly even “procures by endeavour”, the paramilitary’s shooting dead of all the 
villagers by refusing to take the gun and shoot one? If this is thin –the paramilitary 
was, after all, committed to shooting the villagers before Jim arrived on the scene–, 
imagine that Jim had initially accepted the gun offered to him by the paramilitary, 
                                                 
9 Various people have pointed out that, in order for Jim’s dilemma to get off the ground, one also has to 
assume that Jim somehow cannot shoot the paramilitary once he takes the gun. Imagine, therefore, that 
the paramilitary’s colleague keeps his own gun trained on Jim, and (since he is a far better and quicker 
shot than Jim) would successfully shoot Jim if he were to try and turn the tables on the paramilitaries 
once he holds the gun.  
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but then handed it back to the paramilitary, saying “I’m sorry, I just can’t do this”. 
Giving the gun back to the paramilitary surely facilitates the latter’s shooting of the 
villagers, and that the paramilitary would go ahead and shoot the villagers is, of 
course, exactly what Jim foresees as certain (thus, arguably, what he intends in the 
secondary sense of intention recognised in R. v. Woollin (1998)). Is Jim then a 
secondary party to all the villagers’ murders in the event that the paramilitary kills 
them all? We would want to say: he is not. The social meaning of Jim’s actions – 
whether they consist in refusing to take the gun, or in handing it back to the 
paramilitary – is simply not that he wishes the paramilitary to proceed, or is 
indifferent to whether he will do so. It is that he, Jim, does not want to have any 
part in the murder(s).  
The kernel of truth in the association view is that we do indeed need the social 
signal, the token of support, in order to hold A liable for P’s act. The error lies in the 
thought that this is all we need to attribute responsibility for P’s act to A. In truth, 
this is an additional requirement or element in order for an (objectively) furthering 
or facilitating contribution to count as such for the purposes of the criminal law. It 
is the hidden “mental element” in the actus reus of complicity – bound up with the 
act of participation, in that it is what makes this a “participatory” act, and thus 
quite separate from, and additional to, the “mens rea” elements that doctrinal law 
sets out. Put simply: A’s contribution doesn’t count as a contribution to P’s act, 
unless it was indeed (factually speaking) a contribution in the broad causal sense, 
and (socially speaking) a token of support.  
5. Different paradigms of responsibility-ascription and their suitability for 
the assessment of spontaneous group violence 
The previous sub-section leaves us with a broader concern: how should the criminal 
law assess the responsibilities of participants in unplanned violent interactions in a 
way that is sufficiently sensitive to the self-experience of these agents and to 
external factors that – perhaps without these actors’ awareness – influence how 
those caught up in the situation act? The difficulties encountered by the courts 
when applying the principles of secondary liability to these situations leave one 
wondering whether the problem lies perhaps less with unwieldy sets of facts than 
with the doctrinal structures through which the criminal law insists on processing 
these facts. In recognition of this possibility, this section poses the open question of 
what paradigms of responsibility-ascription are best suited to cases of spontaneous 
group violence. I start with the secondary participation paradigm that governs the 
assessment of multiple actors in English criminal law. I then turn to the 
philosophical concept of a group-act. Finding both paradigms wanting in typical 
cases of spontaneous group violence, I then introduce a third ascription paradigm, 
based on an independent assessment of parties’ roles, which I argue is best suited 
to cases of unplanned group violence. 
5.1. The secondary participation paradigm 
The classic secondary participation model attributes responsibility to A for a crime P 
commits by focusing on the influence that A exerted over P’s actions. To be a 
secondary party to P’s crime, A must (in the ideal form of this model) do something 
that encourages or assists P in the commission of his crime, intending (i) for P to 
commit the crime, and (ii) for his action to support or influence P in doing so. Under 
the secondary participation paradigm, A’s liability derives from P’s commission of 
the crime with A’s supportive contribution. Were it not for the connection to P’s 
crime, what A does would be harmless, perhaps even innocuous. A’s contribution 
brings evil into the world “through P” – and A is held responsible for that evil, along 
with P, because he intends for his, A’s, agency to be effective in precisely this way, 
through P. 
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Responsibility attribution under the secondary participation paradigm also serves as 
a scaffold on which responsibility attributions for “further” or “collateral” crimes 
committed by P in the course of committing the target offence rest. Legal systems 
differ in how prepared they are to depart from the secondary participation model 
when assessing A’s liability for P’s commission of a further or collateral crime. Some 
follow a “strict liability” model where A is held liable for the collateral crime when 
the commission of that crime by P was a “natural and probable consequence” of P’s 
commission of the target offence – a solution that cannot be motivated under the 
secondary participation paradigm but has overtones of historic ascriptions of mens 
rea based on the notion that agents always intend the natural and probable 
consequences of their acts (on this point, see further Stuckenberg 2007, pp. 697-
704). For a time, English criminal law ascribed responsibility to A for P’s “further 
crime” on what is perhaps best thought of as a “modified” secondary liability 
paradigm, where – to put this in a simplified manner – instead of A intending that P 
commit the further crime in question it is held sufficient that A foresaw the 
possibility that P might commit that further crime (for details and criticism, see 
Dyson 2015). This position was abandoned in R. v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen 
(2016), but “extended common purpose liability” continues to exist in Australia 
where it was recognised by the High Court in Clayton v. The Queen (2006).  
I do not now want to address the question whether A’s “foresight of the possibility” 
that P may commit a collateral crime of the sort he commits, together with an 
intention to encourage or support P in his endeavours, constitutes an appropriate 
mens rea standard for holding A liable as a secondary party to P’s intentionally 
committed collateral crime (for extensive discussion of the appropriate mens rea 
requirement for the secondary party in such cases, see Simester 2006, Sullivan 
2007, Baker 2015 and Krebs 2015). The main downside of this model when it 
comes to incidents of spontaneous violence is that, as Baker (2015, p. 43 
highlights), the case law applying it often runs roughshod over the requirement 
that A exert an influence also over P’s “further act” – as exemplified by the case 
discussed above, O’Flaherty. While the secondary participation model would 
undoubtedly succeed in tying A to P’s collateral crime in situations where A stands 
next to P, egging P on, while P carries out the collateral criminal act, it cannot deal 
satisfactorily with the far more frequent situation in which A may be nowhere near 
P when P decides to carry out the collateral criminal act and does not become 
aware of P’s collateral offence until it is too late. In many of these cases, it is 
strained if not outright counterfactual to assert that A’s involvement in the target 
crime provided any tangible encouragement or assistance to P’s commission of the 
collateral crime.  
The secondary participation paradigm also seems incapable of capturing the 
psychological experiences of participants in spontaneous violent encounters. What 
ordinary secondary liability recognises is that P’s actions are sufficiently influenced 
by A, such that P, in doing what he, P, chooses to do, also does what A wants P to 
do, and does so (at least in part) as a result of the influence that A exerted on P 
with the aim of assisting or encouraging P’s act. In situations unfolding in a 
spontaneous and unplanned fashion, however, the idea that “A acts through P” 
reflects neither P’s nor A’s situational perceptions and agential experiences.10 When 
A takes himself to be “joining a fight”, the distinctive feature of that joining-in is 
not that he wants to make a difference in the world by exerting an influence over 
the other fighters. Even if he had an awareness that others who fight on his side 
might feel comforted and supported by the knowledge that A has joined in, this is 
not the point of A’s joining-in. A intends for his agency to be effective in the world 
through the things he himself does after joining. Interpreting A’s joining-in as an 
act through which A wants his agency to affect the world through the activities of 
                                                 
10 In the striking words of a prisoner serving a life sentence for murder of which he was convicted as a 
secondary party under joint enterprise rules: “So we’re not at the murders and don’t know the victim or 
nothing but we’re still joint enterprise … Courts are full of shit.” Quoted in Crewe et al. 2015, p. 263. 
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others distorts the character of A’s choice. It cannot simply be assumed that by 
joining in A means to make the others do their acts. That A anticipates further 
fighting activity by the others cannot be equated with A intending to make the 
others do what they do. What A does is not about exerting an influence on another 
through encouragement or assistance: it is about doing his own thing by taking 
part. 
5.2. The collective action or “group act” paradigm 
The last-mentioned point suggests that an appropriate liability paradigm for these 
kinds of cases might be supplied by the notion of collective agency. The criminal 
laws of different jurisdictions invoke such a notion through their conceptions of co-
perpetration. Rather than relying on a legal example, I will however introduce this 
paradigm through the philosophical literature, specifically by drawing on Kutz’s 
“group act” analysis of complicity.  
At the heart of the “group act” model lies the idea of concerted action taken in the 
execution of a common plan. Kutz (2000, p. 69) identifies it as a “common 
structural feature” of a group act (which he calls a “collective action”) that 
“individual members of a group intentionally do their parts in promoting a joint 
outcome”. For this structural feature to be present, the participants (at a minimum) 
(i) have to have a particular outcome in mind, which is broadly the same outcome 
intended by them; they (ii) have to have the notion that they will bring about this 
outcome by acting together (rather than by each of them trying to bring about the 
outcome on his or her own); this notion of acting together also usually requiring 
(iii) some plan or shared idea about how they will collaborate and coordinate their 
activities in order to bring the outcome about.11 Kutz maintains that “what makes a 
set of individual acts a case of jointly intentional action is the content of the 
intentions with which the individuals act”, and, specifically, that “jointly intentional 
action is primarily a function of the way in which individual agents regard their own 
actions as contributing to a collective outcome” (Kutz 2000, p. 74, referred to as 
“participatory intention”). What is special about collaborating actors, according to 
Kutz, is that: “Jointly acting individuals do not merely act in parallel: Each responds 
to what the others do and plan to do” (Kutz 2000, p. 76). 
The behaviour of participants in incidents of spontaneous group violence tends to 
lack a number of features that Kutz identifies as necessary for a group act. Take 
O’Flaherty’s case: At a stretch, some of the behaviour of the participants in this 
encounter might meet the Kutz criteria for joint action of strategic responsiveness, 
shared goals, and mutual openness (at least if each of these criteria is construed 
widely – the goal being perhaps not even the defeat of the Peckham boys, but 
simply to engage them in a fight; responsiveness being constituted by a general 
preparedness to fight in conjunction with others whom one recognises as being on 
one’s own side; mutuality understood in an open-ended way as including anyone 
else who might be on one’s side, whoever they may be). Even so, a problem arises 
with Kutz’s last criterion, a sort of horizontal intention that all the participants have 
“to do his or her part of promoting the group activity or outcome” which, according 
to Kutz, is a “further intentional component, by which agents conceive of their 
actions as standing in a certain instrumental relation to the group act” (Kutz 2000, 
p. 78). For this criterion to be satisfied, participants must at least each know what 
his or her “part” is and how it serves the collective aim. O’Flaherty certainly does 
not meet this criterion – he has only the vaguest sense of what it is that the others 
aim for (other than pursuing the Peckham boys, continuing the fight), nor has he 
                                                 
11 Note that when it comes to group acts, it is perfectly coherent to hypothesise that “accountability 
appears to accrue first to the jointly acting group, and then derivatively to its individual members” (Kutz 
2000, p. 69). Kutz stresses, however, that at the end of the day a collective act will always be 
“explicable in terms of the intentionality of individuals” who take themselves to be acting on behalf of 
the collectivity, as well as “the expectations and beliefs of others regarding what [the collective agent] is 
and what it is capable of” (Kutz 2000, p. 71). 
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got any conception of what “his role” in the fight may be. And O’Flaherty’s case is 
not unusual in this regard. Most spontaneously erupting fights will not meet the 
Kutz criteria for a collective act. Their goal is too undefined to allow participants in 
the fight to relate to each other with the nuanced Kutzian participatory intent of 
doing their bit towards a collective end. This is, incidentally, why it is unsatisfactory 
for the law to treat even spontaneous, unplanned violent fights – labelled as “public 
violence” or “affray” – as genuine collective acts. These may be group offences in 
the sense that they are offences that can only be committed by more than one 
participant, but the interrelation between these participants is not ordinarily 
governed by the interwoven intentions that mark an act out as a group-act (cf. Kutz 
2000, pp. 82-83). The responsibility ascription paradigm of “group action” – which 
allows us to treat the actions of each of the participants as an action performed by 
all, and thus to hold everyone responsible for an outcome brought about by an act 
of one of the group’s members only – requires that “I do my bit because I expect 
you to do your bit, having some sort of idea in my head about what my bit and 
your bit are and what the ultimate goal is that we both want to contribute to”. 
Absent this special contributory intent behind my actions I cannot be said to intend 
to participate in a “group act” by doing what I do. In these cases, it would be unjust 
to hold me responsible for anything other than my own actions. 
5.3. The independent assessment paradigm 
What, however, does it mean to hold someone responsible for “their own actions” 
performed in a situation that involved more than one participant? To see how the 
law might conceptualise an independent assessment paradigm for parties to crime, 
it is worth looking at the provision concerning participants in crime in Swedish 
criminal law.  
Section 23:4 of the Swedish Penal Code (Brottsbalken) provides: 
(1) Punishment provided for in this Code for an act shall be inflicted not only on 
the one who committed the act but also on others who furthered it by advice 
or deed. A person who is not regarded as a perpetrator shall, if he induced 
another to commit the act, be punished for instigation of the crime or else 
for aiding and abetting it. 
(2) Each party to the crime shall be judged according to the intent or the 
negligence attributable to him. (…) (translation by Herlitz 1992, p. 163)  
Brottsbalken section 23:5 adds (inter alia) that someone who “has been a party to 
the crime only to a small degree” may be given a punishment which is “milder than 
that otherwise established for the crime”, and that “in trifling cases no punishment 
shall be imposed”. 
These provisions were first introduced into Swedish law in 1948 and marked – at 
least according to the intentions of the scholar who most strongly promoted their 
adoption, Ivar Strahl – a radical break with the secondary participation model 
based on the notion of derivative liability. Just how radical the break was has been 
much disputed among Swedish writers, and is – unsurprisingly – connected to 
different possible interpretations of the provision itself. The main area of dispute 
relates to the proper interpretation of the reference object of section 23:4 sub-
section (1): the “act” for which punishment is provided in the Code. This “complicity 
object”, as it is referred to in the literature, can be differently construed – in 
particular, by requiring either a “wrongful act” which could exist independently of 
the defendant’s contribution, or a “wrongful act” arising through, and in conjunction 
with, whatever it was that the defendant intended and/or did (see Herlitz 1992, pp. 
183-226). The application of this provision has thus brought back into Swedish law, 
by the back door as it were, many of the problems (and solutions) of responsibility 
ascription familiar from the secondary participation and the group act models. But 
one difference remains: the existence of the provision makes it possible to choose 
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between different responsibility ascription paradigms in different cases, and these 
paradigms are not exhausted by quasi-derivative and group-act models. Where 
these models threaten to distort rather than capture the quality of a defendant’s 
contribution to a crime, recourse should be had to Strahl’s original vision for the 
new law, brought out most clearly in an article he wrote in 1943, where he argued 
forcefully that the cornerstone of the reform should be “the principle that each and 
every one of the parties is only liable in accordance with what he has done, 
irrespective of what the other parties have committed.” (Strahl 1943 quoted Herlitz 
1992, pp. 210-211).  
Where a natural description of what a party has done does not lead us to describe 
that party’s connection to the wrongful harm in terms of the influence that party 
exerted over the activities of the direct agent, or to focus on some consciously co-
ordinated behaviour between the participants that would allow us to attribute the 
activities of each of their number to all of them, we should jettison the secondary-
participation and the group-act models in favour of a different ascription paradigm. 
The decisive question in instances of loose, spontaneous, disorganised group action 
is, simply, “how does what A did implicate him in the fatal outcome?”  
This question, in fact, accords with what participants in spontaneous violent 
encounters that turn nasty and lead to fatalities are reported to ask themselves 
after the event. Not “What did I do to make him do it?”, but “What did I do to make 
this happen?”, is the question that preys on their minds (see the interviews 
reported in Crewe et al. 2015, pp. 266-267). They see themselves as potentially 
standing in a relation to the outcome brought about through their broad 
involvement in an incident during which one of the things that happens is that one 
of their group performs the violent act in question that leads to the fatal outcome 
quite on his own, and motivated by his own objectives and feelings that have arisen 
out of the incident. It would seem to those also part of the group that one asks the 
wrong question about their responsibility if one were now to hang this on how their 
earlier behaviour may somehow have influenced the perpetrator at the moment 
when he performed the fatal act. This is a distraction from what matters: it is clear 
to these others that the relation in which they stand to the fatal act is not mediated 
through anything like any influence they exerted on the perpetrator at that very 
moment: the perpetrator was not their “agent” (in a civil law sense) or instrument, 
they did not act “through him”. But that observation does not – and ought not to – 
settle the question whether they can completely disassociate themselves from what 
the perpetrator did by pointing to their lack of secondary-participatory influence. 
The answer is that this observation only blocks responsibility attribution on the 
derivative liability model. But it does not block responsibility attribution under an 
“independent contribution through risk-creation” model. 
The strength of the Swedish model is that it instructs the judge to ask the question: 
Where is the gravamen of each party’s wrong? It is in my view entirely appropriate 
when, under this general heading, the courts then develop distinctive typologies of 
structurally different wrongs. The secondary-participation paradigm serves us well 
in cases where the wrong that A commits is essentially the wrong of bringing harm 
into the world through P. The group-act paradigm serves us well when the 
gravamen of the wrong lies in doing the criminal or harmful thing together. The 
independent contribution perspective is the appropriate one when the focus is not 
on what A brings into the world through or with P, but through his own act’s 
ultimate connection to the wrongful harm. We cannot say in advance which of these 
three perspectives is the most appropriate for capturing the quality of A’s actions 
during a specific incident of initially unplanned escalating violence. But we can say 
that allowing for these different avenues to co-exist would enable the courts to 
bring the legal evaluation of such incidents into line with the psychological realities 
of group action.  
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6. Conclusion 
Semi- or unplanned violent fights have given rise to criminal cases for as long as 
any legal system can remember. It is ironic, then, that in “a branch of law which is 
concerned with the affairs of man generally speaking in their simplest and least 
complicated forms” (Lord Coleridge CJ in R. v. Coney (1882, p. 569), the law’s least 
simple and most complicated doctrines have been developed and invoked to 
provide these cases with adequate legal solutions.  
Propelled on the tracks of doctrinal analysis, judicial decisions can easily lose sight 
of the bigger question of what model of responsibility ascription fits the ontology of 
spontaneous group violence and the experienced psychological reality of those 
participating in such incidents. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jogee with its 
explicit reference to “a more or less spontaneous outbreak of multi-handed 
violence” (R. v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen 2016, para. 95) comes within 
touching distance of addressing this question head-on but retreats to the 
supposedly doctrinally safe position that the “ordinary principles of secondary 
liability” (R. v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen 2016, para. 76) can handle all cases. 
Yet when the judgment refers to how a person who “is a party to a violent attack 
on another, without an intent to assist in the causing of death or really serious 
harm, but the violence escalates and results in death” becomes “guilty of 
manslaughter”, as does someone who “participates by encouragement or 
assistance in any other unlawful act which all sober and reasonable people would 
realise carried the risk of some harm … to another, and death in fact results” (R. v. 
Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen 2016, para. 96), we are immediately left to ponder 
what the true basis for this liability is. Is it really based on the secondary party’s 
participation in the principal’s murderous act, which is by reason of the secondary 
party’s insufficient mens rea to be ascribed to that party as liability for 
manslaughter, or does it rather represent, in substance, a direct ascription of 
responsibility for a fatal outcome by reason of the fact that this party’s contribution 
to the initial crime also contributed to the risk of violent escalation?  
Perhaps the courts would be better served by an approach that, as Farmer (2007, 
p. 154) advocated, would be concerned “less with the question of who is the 
principal and who the accomplice … than with recognising appropriate modes of 
responsibility to match … the moral (and political and legal) positions of the people 
in the world – the all important context within which liability would be assessed.” 
There are many multiple-actor scenarios where it is entirely appropriate to focus on 
the question of who is a principal and who is an accomplice, and in which we should 
resolve this question according to the standard model of secondary liability. There 
are cases of co-ordinated human activity where we cannot even describe what’s 
going on unless we draw on the philosophical concept of a “group act” and engage 
with theories of collective action. But in most cases of spontaneous unplanned 
violence, these two responsibility-ascription models are better cast aside as 
unsuited to the facts before us. The fluidity of these events, their spontaneously 
evolving nature, shifting participant roles and inbuilt tendency towards sudden 
escalation makes it impossible to tie participants down to clear or stable functions. 
The self-understanding of participants is that they “do something to further an 
objective” which is neither very clearly defined nor pursued in an organised, co-
operative manner. Their focus is not on acting with or through the other parties but 
on acting alongside them, and only in this sense, jointly. The psychological 
situational action structure is best reflected in an independent assessment of each 
participant’s contribution to the wrongful harm. 
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